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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930609-CA 
v. : 
ANTHONY LEE STERLING, - : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated 
assault by a prisoner, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5(1) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was defendant unfairly prejudiced by the surprise 
testimony of Officer Dana concerning defendant's admissions? 
This issue has not been preserved for appeal. 
Defendant never requested that the trial court exercise its 
remedial powers under rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and thereby waived his claim of unfair prejudice in the 
trial court. State v. Larson 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989). 
2. Was defendant unfairly prejudiced by the alleged 
conduct of Officer Dalton during closing argument? 
This issue has not been preserved for appeal. 
Defendant affirmatively waived any claim of prejudice based on 
the officer's alleged conduct in the trial court. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "invited error [] is procedurally 
unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially where ample 
opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result. State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)). 
3. Was defendant unfairly prejudiced by the alleged 
improper contact of the bailiff with the deliberating jury? 
I 
This issue has not been preserved for appeal. 
Defendant affirmatively waived any claim of prejudice based on 
the alleged improper contact in the trial court. Parsons, 781 
P.2d at 1285; State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault by a 
prisoner, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103.5(1) (1990) (R. 1\. 
Following a two day jury trial held August 20 and 23, 
1993, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 124). 
2 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a one to 15 year 
term in the Utah State Prison and imposed $600 restitution (R. 
125, 595-97).x 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1992, defendant was serving out a 
sentence for aggravated assault on a police officer in the San 
Juan County Jail (R. 245-46, 489). At approximately 1:00 p.m., 
that afternoon, defendant began yelling and waving to inmates in 
a neighboring cell block (R. 247). Correctional Officer Butler, 
gave defendant a verbal warning (R. 247). In response, defendant 
became abusive, "[u]sing foul language," and denying any 
misconduct (R. 247). Officer Butler ordered defendant to "rack 
in" (R. 248).2 Defendant refused (R. 250). Officer Butler gave 
at least two more "rack in" orders which defendant also refused 
(R. 251). 
Instead, defendant became increasingly agitated and 
asked if he would be "written up" (R. 251, 253). When Officer 
Butler informed defendant that a disciplinary report would be 
filed, defendant threatened, "'You will have to rack me in'" (R. 
1
 The trial court did not specify whether defendant's 
sentence was consecutive to, or concurrent with, any other term 
he was then serving. Accordingly, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401 (1990), the instant term is presumed to run concurrent with 
any other term defendant may be serving. 
2
 The "rack in" order is generally given when an inmate 
becomes "unruly" or "agitated." The order requires the inmate to 
return to his cell (R. 248). 
3 
1 
252, 268). Defendant then began "pacing" in the day room,3 
stopping alternately to "stand, feet wide apart and stare into 
{ 
dispatch" (R. 253, 285). Additional correctional officers were 
called to help handle the potential security incident (R. 318). 
Officers Bradford and Christensen responded to the 
i 
dispatch area (R. 318). Officer Bradford observed that defendant 
was visibly agitated, "pacing back and forth" (R. 320) . Officer 
Bradford asked defendant "what the problem was" (R. 320). 
Defendant responded that he was being "hassled" by the other 
officers (R. 321) . Defendant claimed the officers were trying to 
"rack him in without any cause" (R. 321). Officer Bradford asked 
defendant to "rack in," and defendant refused (R. 321). 
Faced with defendant's consistent refusal to "rack in," 
the officers began preparing for a "forced-cell entry" (R. 322). 
All prisoners were ordered to "rack in" and the officers locked 
the remaining cell blocks and otherwise prepared the jail for a 
security incident (R. 323). 
Defendant remained agitated during the approximately 15 
minutes required to secure the jail (R. 323). Specifically, 
defendant "took the mop head off the mop handle and began 
twirling it like Ninja-type[.] . . . It was a defiance, a 
challenge to us to come in and take him out type thing" (R. 323, 
328). Defendant was again ordered to "rack in" and refused, 
3
 The cell blocks in the San Juan County Jail are pie 
shaped and arranged in a circle, sharing a common day room area 
in the center (R. 258). 
4 
threatening, "If I'm going to get a write-up, you're going to 
have to come and rack me in" (R. 323) . 
Following this refusal, defendant requested an attorney 
(R. 324). Officer Christensen advised defendant that if he would 
"comply with an order to move into the adjacent housing block, . 
. . where he would be by himself," he would be allowed to make 
the "legal call" (R. 324, 386). Defendant continued his hostile 
activity and began barricading the main entrance to cell block E 
(R. 324, 360) . Defendant then took the mop wringer, mop handle 
and broom upstairs to the top tier of the cell block (R. 329). 
Striking the mop handle over the railing, defendant broke the 
handle into several sharp edged pieces (R. 332). 
At this point, Officers Bradford and Dalton briefly 
entered cell block E to remove the barricade defendant had 
erected (R. 332, 422). Moments later, the five officers 
constituting the "forced-cell entry team" entered cell block E 
(R. 332) . Two officers approached defendant from the lower fire 
door entrance and one officer approached defendant from the upper 
fire door entrance to the cell block (R. 334, 389) . Officers 
Dalton and Bradford re-entered through the main cell block 
entrance and proceeded up the stairs toward defendant (R. 338, 
422). 
Officer Dalton ordered defendant to "rack in" (R. 338). 
Defendant again refused, threatening that one of the officers was 
"going to get hurt" (R. 334, 338). When Officers Dalton and 
Bradford were approximately half way up the stairs, defendant 
5 
I 
hurled the mop wringer at Officer Dalton (R. 338). Officer 
Dalton deflected the mop wringer with his shield (R. 424). 
Officer Bradford immediately began to spray capstun, a 
capsicum/pepper solution used to subdue inmates, at defendant (R. 
271, 424) . Defendant continued to hurl pieces of broken mop 
handle at the approaching officers (R. 33 9, 3 66) . However, the 
capstun immediately effected defendant, enabling Officer Dalton 
to tackle and subdue him, bringing the security incident to an 
end (R. 339). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
None of the issues defendant has attempted to raise on 
appeal are properly before the Court. Specifically, defendant's 
claim of unfair prejudice regarding the admission of Officer 
Dana's testimony is precluded by the fact that he at no time 
moved the trial court for a continuance or other similar remedy 
under rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Defendant's remaining contentions concerning the 
propriety of Officer Dalton's conduct during closing argument and 
the alleged improper contact between the bailiff and the 
deliberating jury should be rejected under the doctrine of 
invited error. Defendant affirmatively represented to the trial 
court that he was unconcerned with both matters and desired to 




DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION OF A DISCOVERY 
VIOLATION IS WAIVED FOR FAILURE TO ASSERT THE 
CLAIM BELOW; MOREOVER, DEFENDANT 
AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF UNFAIR 
PREJUDICE IN THE TRIAL COURT BY NOT 
REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE OR OTHER SIMILAR 
RELIEF UNDER RULE 16(g), UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
In point I of his brief, defendant asserts that he was 
unfairly prejudiced at trial because he was not afforded adequate 
time to "prepare for the testimony of [Officer] Dana and adjust 
his trial strategy." Br. of App. at 6. Further, defendant 
claims that, but for the prosecutor's alleged failure to disclose 
Officer Dana's testimony, he "would likely have" sought to 
exclude Officer Dana's testimony in the trial court. Br. of App. 
at 8. Defendant has not adequately preserved this issue for 
review. 
A. Proceedings Below 
Defendant filed a request for discovery on May 10, 
1993, requesting in part: 
All relevant written or recorded statements 
of the [d]efendant.and witnesses, including 
copies of police reports as a result of those 
statements, and copies of [d]epositions. 
The names and addresses of all the witnesses 
the prosecution proposes to call at the time 
of trial not supplied in response to the 
above requests. 
(R. 26-27) (a complete copy of defendant's Request for Discovery 
is attached as addendum A). The prosecutor filed an answer to 
7 
i 
defendant's discovery request on August 19, 1993 (R. 113) (a 
complete copy of the Answer to Request For Discovery is attached
 t 
as Addendum B). The answer included a copy of an investigative 
report filed by Officer Dana, pursuant to a Department of 
Corrections investigation of San Juan County Jail personnel, as
 { 
well as a list of the State's proposed witnesses, including 
Officer Dana (R. 113-14), see addendum B). 
On the first day of trial, August 20, 1993, defense 
counsel objected to the calling of Officer Dana as a prosecution 
witness (R. 295) (the pertinent transcript pages are attached as 
addenda C-D). Defense counsel complained he had not been 
notified that Officer Dana would be a witness until August 18, 
1993, when the prosecutor's secretary "offered to fax [the] 
report" (R. 295, 378), see addenda C-D 
The prosecutor informed the trial court that Officer 
Dana was intended primarily as a rebuttal witness, but also would 
testify concerning "some admissions made by [defendant] to him" 
(R. 296) , see addendum C. 
The trial court asked the prosecutor when he first 
became aware of defendant's admissions to Officer Dana (R. 296), 
see addendum C. The prosecutor responded that Officer Dana had 
investigated 
a grievance filed by [defendant]. He came 
out and talked to one of the officers, 
talking to prisoners. He wrote a report, and 
I guess that report has been available to me 
but I haven't had it in my file, I mean, I 
didn't really know it existed, except that he 
had done an investigation and found that the 
jail personnel -- that isn't really part of 
8 
this -- but he did an investigation for the 
Department of Corrections as to whether or 
not they acted appropriately. That's the 
basis of the report. 
(R. 296-97), see addendum C. 
Defense counsel indicated that he had no objection to 
Officer Dana's proposed rebuttal testimony, but objected to the 
officer's proposed testimony concerning defendant's admissions 
(R. 297), see addendum C. 
The trial court ruled that the prosecutor was required 
to "give" defendant Officer Dana's report, "to the extent that he 
has them [sic]. If [the prosecutor] does not have this report 
then -- until this week, then he's only required to give it to 
[defendant] when he has it" (R. 297), see addendum C. Upon 
clarifying that the prosecutor had not received Officer Dana's 
report until the week of trial, the court allowed Officer Dana to 
testify (R. 297), see addendum C. 
Following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel 
indicated he would make another objection "on the record, . . . 
[a]t the first opportunity after the jury's gone" (R. 297), see 
addendum C. 
Officer Dana then took the stand and testified 
concerning his interview with defendant, which interview took 
place the day after the security incident at the San Juan County 
Jail (R. 298, 301). Officer Dana "advised" defendant that he was 
there "to get his side of the story,11 and also advised defendant 
"that he had a right not to speak with [him]" (R. 301). 
9 
i 
Defense counsel objected to Officer Dana's testifying 
concerning the substance of the interview, on the ground that 
Officer Dana had not given defendant "proper Miranda warnings" ^ 
(R. 301-02). Without ruling on defendant's objection, the trial 
court allowed the prosecutor limited, further questioning (R. 
303). Officer Dana clarified that he did not interview defendant { 
on "behalf of San Juan County or as part of the investigation of 
the criminal allegations" against defendant (R. 3 03) , see 
addendum C. Rather, the officer's investigation was for the ' 
purpose of determining whether defendant "would be justified in 
bringing charges against the jail personnel" (R. 3 04), see 
addendum C. < 
Based upon the officer's explanation concerning the 
non-accusatory nature of his interview with defendant, the trial 
court found that "a complete [Miranda warning] was not necessary" 
(R. 307), see addendum C. Consistent with the trial court's 
ruling, Officer Dana then related defendant's admission that he 
threatened to hurt the officers if they approached him (R. 310). 
During the next trial recess following Officer Dana's 
testimony, defense counsel renewed his objection to the officer's 
testimony on the ground of "surprise:" 
I just want to put on the record the [sic] --
my objection to [Officer] Dana being allowed 
to testify. I would allege some surprise on 
that. I was not advised until Wednesday 
night in a conversation with [the 
prosecutor's] office that he would 
potentially be a witness. They offered to 
fax his report to me that evening. It was 
about four o'clock, and I just said I would 
10 
pick them up the next morning when I was 
here. 
(R. 3 78), see addendum D. 
The trial court again inquired when the prosecutor had 
received Officer Dana's report and the prosecutor specifically 
indicated that the report "was received by the county attorney's 
office on August 18, 1993, . . . [t]hat's Wednesday (R. 378), see 
addendum D. The prosecutor further indicated that was also the 
time he determined to make use of the report at trial (R. 378), 
see addendum D. 
The trial court then asked defense counsel to specify 
"what prejudice [he] suffered as a result of finding out about 
[the report] two days ago rather than two months ago?" (R. 379), 
see addendum D. Defense counsel alleged "surprise" regarding the 
defendant's admissions testified to by Officer Dana (R. 379), see 
addendum D. The trial court again inquired what prejudice 
defense counsel suffered, or "[w]hat [it was] that [defendant 
was] not able to do in the last two days that [he] could have 
done in the last two months if [he had] known two months earlier 
about [the report]?" (R- 380), see addendum D. Defense counsel 
replied simply that "[defendant] may have taken a plea" (R. 380), 
see addendum D. Based on defense counsel's response, the trial 
court overruled defendant's objection to the admission of Officer 
Dana's testimony (R- 380), see addendum D. 
B. Waiver at Trial 
Defendant's claim of unfair prejudice regarding the 
admission of Officer Dana's testimony is precluded by the fact 
11 
that he at no time moved the trial court for a continuance or 
other similar remedy under rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.4 In State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court considered an issue similar to that raised 
here. Like defendant, Griffiths obtained a discovery order 
requiring the State to disclose all statements made by 
defendant." Id. at 882. However, certain of Griffith's 
statements that were inconsistent with the testimony of his alibi 
witness were not disclosed until shortly before trial. Id. 
Griffiths objected to the prosecutor's attempt to impeach his 
alibi witness with the statements and, after the evidence was 
admitted, moved for a mistrial, which motion the trial court 
denied. Id. 
On appeal, the supreme court rejected Griffiths' claim 
of unfair prejudice on the "elementary" ground that he had 
neglected to request a continuance under rule 16(g), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure: 
Despite being informed of defendant's 
statements prior to trial and having 
reasonable knowledge that such statements 
might be used by the prosecution, defense 
counsel did not move for a continuance, to 
Rule 16(g) provides: 
If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply 
with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
12 
which he would have been entitled. Thus, 
under the facts of this case, we conclude 
that defendant waived relief under rule 16(g) 
. . . by not making timely efforts to 
mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by 
the prosecutor's conduct. 
Id. See also State v. Larson 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989) 
(failure to request continuance held determinative of Larson's 
right to claim error on appeal); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 
919 n.6 (Utah 1987) (recognizing significance of a motion for 
relief under rule 16(g)). 
This Court should similarly reject defendant's 
assertion of unfair prejudice. This is not a situation similar 
to that in Knight, upon which defendant purports to rely. See 
Br. of App. at 7-8. Specifically, despite finding the 
prosecution had violated its discovery obligations, the Knight 
trial court denied Knight's motions for mistrial and continuance 
when two witnesses gave unanticipated testimony. 734 P.2d at 
919. On appeal, the supreme court found that the trial court's 
failure to grant the reguested relief seriously impaired Knight's 
defense. Id. If defendant, like Knight, believed he needed more 
time to adequately prepare to meet Officer Dana's testimony, he 
should have similarly moved for relief under rule 16(g). His 
failure to do so is dispositive of his claim of unfair prejudice 
in this Court. Id. at 919 n.6. 
As for defendant's speculation that if he had earlier 
known the substance of Officer Dana's testimony, he "would likely 
have" sought a "suppression hearing" to exclude "the statements 
made without [Miranda warnings]," Br. of App. at 8, defendant did 
13 
i 
in fact attempt to exclude Officer Dana's testimony in the trial 
court (R. 302), see Addendum C. On appeal, defendant wholly 
I 
fails to articulate what he would have done differently had he 
known earlier the substance of Officer Dana's testimony. Br. of 
App. at 8. He points to no additional facts and no additional 
i 
legal authority that, with extra preparation time, he would have 
discovered and relied on below to prevail on his suppression 
motion. Indeed, defendant's speculative and unsupported 
assertion of prejudice is devoid of legal authority, analysis and 
citations to the record. As such, it fails to comply with rule 
24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and may be properly 
i 
rejected on that ground. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (declining to address issue unsupported by "any legal 
analysis or authority"); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah 
App. 1992) (declining to consider claim unsupported by citations 
to the record and legal analysis). 
Finally, even assuming that additional preparation 
would have allowed defendant to prevail on his motion to suppress 
Officer Dana's testimony, there is no likelihood of a different 
trial result. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 921 (credible claim of 
prejudice can be rebutted "by showing that despite the errors, 
the outcome of trial merits confidence and there is no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant"). As 
referenced supra, in the Statement of The Facts, pp. 3-6, 
defendant's unruly conduct was directly observed by the five 
correctional officers who testified against him (R. 245, 247-55, 
14 
269-71, 284-87, 289, 293-94, 320-45, 359-361, 366-69, 387-90, 
399-400, 403, 422-28, 431-32). Further, Officers Butler (R. 
268), Eldredge (R. 286), Bradford (R. 334, 338), Christensen (R. 
399) and Dalton (R. 427, 432) all testified concerning 
defendant's verbal threats of harm. Finally, Officers Dalton and 
Bradford testified concerning defendant's physically assaultive 
conduct, hurling the mop wringer and pieces of the broken mop 
handle directly at them (R. 338-39, 345, 424). In light of the 
foregoing, Officer Dana's testimony was cumulative and 
contributed little, if anything to the testimony of the other 
officers. Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt 
presented at trial, there can be no doubt that error, if any, was 
harmless. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
RESULTING FROM ALLEGED CONDUCT ON THE PART OF 
A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WAS AFFIRMATIVELY 
WAIVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In Point II of his brief, defendant broadly asserts 
"that the presence of the law enforcement officer/'victim' with a 
weapon adversely affected his right to a fair trial." Br. of 
App. at 9. Further, defendant asserts that "[e]ven if this Court 
finds there is no adequate showing of the existence of a gun, the 
mere presence of the extra security seated behind [him] is enough 
to garner this Court's concern." Br. of App. at 9. Defendant 
affirmatively waived any claim of unfair prejudice resulting from 
the officer's alleged conduct in the trial court. 
15 
A. Proceedings Below 
After the jury retired for deliberations, defense 
counsel alleged certain conduct on the part of Correctional 
Officer Dalton, which defendant claimed to have observed during 
closing argument: 
. . . Your Honor, during closing 
arguments [defendant] advised me of the fact 
that a law enforcement officer had come into 
the courtroom with a weapon and was behind 
him, apparently brandishing5 the weapon or 
handling it in a nervous fashion, such as to 
convey to the jury that it was impression 
[sic] that [defendant] was a security risk. 
He expressed some concern to me about some 
prejudice that might give the jury against 
him. 
(R. 577), see addendum E. Having brought the alleged incident to 
the attention of the trial court, defense counsel further 
indicated that defendant wished to waive any allegation of 
adverse prejudice that could potentially result from the alleged 
conduct: 
s
 Defendant subsequently denied having characterized 
Officer Dalton as "brandishing" a weapon (R. 578-79) (the 
pertinent transcript pages are attached as Addendum E). Rather, 
defendant claimed to have described the officer as "handling" the 
weapon (R. 579), see addendum E. Specifically, defendant claimed 
that 
[Officer] Dalton . . . kept on reaching up 
and like rubbing his hip right where his 
firearm was at. Victims cannot bring 
firearms. And I don't have a problem with 
it, like you said, the jury was paying 
attention to the attorneys. I just need this 
noted that, you know 
(R. 579), see addendum E. 
16 
[Defendant] asked me to make a motion to 
dismiss. I advised him that I didn't think 
the court would dismiss the charges against 
him on that --on the basis of that 
happening, that the court might consider that 
as grounds to declare a mistrial. And in 
speaking with him, he has told me that he 
will waive that he is aware of that but that 
he's anxious to get a verdict on this today 
and that he waives any prejudice or any 
problems that may have been caused by reason 
of that officer displaying that weapon. 
(R. 577), see addendum E. Defendant affirmed defense counsel's 
representation, stating: "I just feel it should be noted so that 
it doesn't happen again and maybe prejudice somebody else's 
trial" (R. 578), see addendum E. 
The trial court expressly found that neither he, the 
prosecutor nor defense counsel had "noticed" the officer's 
alleged conduct during closing argument (R. 578), see addendum E. 
Moreover, the trial court found that he had been "watching the 
jury during closing arguments" and "[t]hey seemed to be paying 
attention to the lawyers and not to other things" (R. 578) , see 
addendum E. 
The prosecutor pointed out that defendant's assertion 
that the officer was carrying a gun was unsupported, to which 
defendant responded: "Okay. " Then let's just forget the idea, if 
we've got to go through all the -- all the lying and bullshit. . 
. . I don't want to argue. I'm just making a note of it (R. 580-
81), see addendum E. Based on the foregoing, the trial court 
further found that 
. . . it is the policy of the court that 
[officers], except for the bailiff and those 
in charge of a state prisoner, not have any 
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firearms and so [Officer Dalton] may not have 
had his firearm at all. So, there's no 
finding that he actually had his firearm. 
(R. 581), see addendum E. Finally, the trial court found that ^ 
"the defendant has stated he doesn't want to ask for a mistrial" 
(R. 581), see addendum E. 
B. Invited Error { 
Defendant's allegation of adverse prejudice resulting 
from the alleged conduct of Officer Dalton should be rejected as 
constituting invited error. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 
1285 (Utah 1989) ("invited error [] is procedurally unjustified 
and viewed with disfavor" (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
560-61 (Utah 1987)). As demonstrated supra, Part A, defendant 
represented to the trial court that he did not wish to claim any 
adverse prejudice based on the alleged conduct of Officer Dalton 
(R. 577-78), see addendum E. For the first time on appeal, 
defendant attempts to claim that he was in fact unfairly 
prejudiced by the alleged incident he intentionally dismissed as 
not worth arguing about below (R. 580-81), see addendum E. 
Because error, if any, was invited by defendant's active waiver 
of this issue below, this Court must reject defendant's challenge 
to the same on appeal. As recognized in Parsons, "[t]o rule 
otherwise would permit a defendant in a criminal case to "invite" 
prejudicial error and implant it in the record as a form of 




DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE ALLEGED 
IMPROPER CONTACT OF THE BAILIFF WITH THE JURY 
IN THE TRIAL COURT 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that 
alleged improper contact between the bailiff and the deliberating 
jury unfairly prejudiced his defense. Br, of App. at 10-12. 
However, when the contact was brought to defendant's attention 
below, he affirmatively waived any resulting claim of prejudice. 
A. Proceedings Below 
Following the presentation of evidence below, the trial 
court brought to the parties' attention arguably improper contact 
between the bailiff and the deliberating jury: 
Now, I think we need to make a record 
about something else that happened. The 
bailiff was a new bailiff and he went into 
the - he went into the jury room with the 
jurors and showed them where the restroom was 
and he stayed in there for some time. I 
think he believes that he was supposed to 
stay in the jury room with the jury. When we 
found that he was doing that, I think it was 
about five minutes after we'd excused the 
jury, the clerk went in and retrieved the 
bailiff so that he was outside the --he was 
not in the presence of the jury during 
anything except perhaps the first five 
minutes of their deliberations. 
(R. 581-82) (the pertinent transcript pages are attached as 
addendum F). 
Having explained the problem, the trial court inquired 
if defense counsel desired "to make any issue about [the matter]" 
(R. 582), see addendum F. Defense counsel requested that the 
court question the bailiff "as to whether or not he had any 
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conversations or communications with the -- with any of the 
jurors" (R. 582), see addendum F. 
The trial court and defense counsel then questioned the 
unsworn bailiff concerning the alleged contact: 
THE COURT: Bailiff, Mr. Bailiff, did you --
did the jurors ask you any questions? 
THE BAILIFF: No questions were asked and I 
sat in the corner. 
THE COURT: You sat in the corner? 
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. I sat away from them by 
the machine that's in there. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE BAILIFF: (Continuing) -- They didn't ask 
me any questions and I didn't speak to them. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Had they begun their 
deliberations? 
THE COURT: Had they begun the deliberations 
when you were asked to leave? 
THE BAILIFF: They started to talk about how 
they were going to pick a foreman. It was 
more on picking the foreman and what they 
were going to do rather than on 
deliberations. 
THE COURT: So -- so they hadn't begun to 
discuss the merits of the case yet? Just how 
they were going to pick a foreman. Is that 
right? 
THE BAILIFF: They'd started talking about 
the mop wringer and I told them, there it is 
if you want to look at it. That's about it. 
But they'd started talking about that. One 
of the jurors had talked about [defendant]. 
I just pointed out that they -- you know, the 
evidence was there, that they could --
THE COURT: Well, you also brought the 
evidence into the jury. 
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THE BAILIFF: Yes. 
THE COURT: Was that -- was that when someone 
or [sic] said something about the mop wringer 
is when you brought the evidence in? 
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. Pretty much. Well, when 
they sat down, one of the jurors started 
talking about it. 
(R. 582-83), see addendum F. 
Following the Bailiff's explanation of the contact, the 
trial court asked defense counsel what, if anything, he desired 
the court to do (R. 583), see addendum F. Defense counsel 
replied: 
I guess I'm in kind of a bind, Your Honor. 
[Defendant] advises me on this issue as well 
it's not his desire, and I spoke with him 
about this prior to you taking the bench, 
about this issue as well as the gun, and he 
indicated at that time as well as now that he 
doesn't want to ask this court for a 
mistrial. That he just wants to go ahead and 
have the matter resolved today. So, I -- I 
guess I'm asking -- not asking the court for 
anything about that. On the other hand, I 
think it's something that I'd -- in the event 
of an unfavorable verdict, would feel 
compelled to speak to some of the jurors 
myself to see if the officer's presence there 
had any effect on them. 
(R. 583-84), see addendum F. 
Following defense counsel's statement, the trial court 
further inquired, "based on the evidence, by what you've been 
told at this point, you're not asking for a mistrial, is that 
right?" (R. 584), see addendum F. Defense counsel responded 
affirmatively, stating, "No, Your Honor. And that's at my 
client's instructions" (R. 584), see addendum F. The trial court 
sought confirmation of defense counsel's representation from 
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defendant who affirmatively responded, "Yes, sir[,]M to the 
court's inquiry (R. 584), see addendum F. 
B, Invited Error i 
Defendant's allegation of adverse prejudice resulting 
from the bailiff's alleged improper contact with the deliberating 
jury constitutes yet another example of invited error. State v. ( 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989); State v. Dav. 815 P.2d 
1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991). As demonstrated supra, Part A, 
defendant affirmatively represented to the trial court that he < 
did not wish to claim any adverse prejudice based on the 
bailiff's contact with the deliberating jurors (R. 583-84), see 
addendum F. Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims < 
he was in fact unfairly prejudiced by the contact. 
This Court has previously dealt with a similar issue of 
improper jury contact in Day. Like defendant, Day "consciously 
declined to object at trial," to alleged improper contact between 
the bailiff and a juror. Day, 815 P.2d at 1349. Because Day had 
knowledge of the incident below and consciously declined to 
object, this Court rejected Day's attempt to challenge the 
alleged improper contact on appeal as constituting invited error: 
if defense counsel, having knowledge of 
improper contact, fails to make a timely 
objection, 'relief by new trial will not be 
granted, for the reason that a party will not 
be allowed . . . to remain silent and 
speculate upon the chances of a verdict.' 
Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989) 
(quoting in turn (Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188, 190 
(1928)). See also Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284-85 (similarly 
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declining to entertain Parsons' allegation of improper 
witness/juror contact because Parsons affirmatively waived any 
potential prejudice resulting from alleged improper contact in 
the trial court). 
The Court should similarly reject defendant's 
allegation of adverse prejudice under the invited error doctrine. 
Defendant was made aware of the bailiff's contact with the 
deliberating jury below and affirmatively decided against making 
an issue of the matter there (R. 584), see addendum F. If 
defendant was truly troubled by the contact below, he should have 
so argued to the trial court. Day, 815 P.2d at 1349. In 
affirmatively representing that he was unconcerned by the contact 
in the trial court, defendant consciously invited the possibility 
of error into the trial court proceedings. His argument should 
be rejected on that ground. See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
158 (Utah 1989) ("if a party through counsel has made a conscious 
decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court 
into error, we will then decline to save that party from the 
error), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm 
defendant's second degree felony conviction for aggravated 
assault by a prisoner, 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE CF UTAH 
William L. Schultz, #3626 
Attorney at Law 
59 East Center 
Moab, Utah 64532 
(801) 259-5914 
Attorney -for De-fendant 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainti-f-f, 
vs. 
ANTHONY LEE STERLING, 
De-fendant. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
NO . 1^/7.2^7 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
De-fendant requests that Plainti-f-f supply his counsel copies o-f 
all material or information which is within the knowledge of the 
prosecution or his agents and police officers. The herein 
requested information is not to be sent to the Court, but 
certification sent to the Court that the requests made herein 
have been complied with or objected to, so that the same is not 
part of the court file to impair the neutrality of the Judge to 
hear the case. 
1. All relevant written or recorded statements of the 
Defendant and witnesses, including copies of police reports as a 
result of those statements, and copies of Depositions. 
2. The criminal record of Defendant. 
3. An itemization including identification of all 
physical evidence seized from the Defendant, identify time and 
place of seizure and the names of the persons actually seizing 
the evidence, time and date of seizure, location of seizure, 
witnesses thereto, and the present location of said evidence. 
4. Copies of breathalyzer results, checklist and 
logs. 
S» If any of the seized evidence no longer exists 
because of destruction, copies of all documents prepared in the 
analysis of such evidence. 
6. If the physical evidence in request. No. 5 above 
has been destroyed, at whose direction was it destroyed? If not 
destroyed, please specify a reasonable place prior to the hearing 
where Defendant's counsel may examine and retest the same. 
7. If the Plaintiff intends to offer evidence of 
Defendant's actions or behavior after police confrontation, the 
same being offered for purposes of inferring or establishing 
guilt because of the alleged abnormalities of said acts or 
behavior, set forth what the behavior or acts were, what is the 
alleged abnormality of same, and the scientific and medical basis 
on which to judge that alleged abnormality. 
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i 
8. Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, or mitigate the guilt of the 
accused. 
9. The names and addresses of all the witnesses the 
prosecution proposes to call at the time of trial not supplied in 
response to the above requests. 
DATED this _(/ _££_ day of May, 1993. 
1A£ 
Will iam L. ScfjiAltz 
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ADDENDUM B 
u r3:r> r.-.> j J=3 
! 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 && i 3 83 
p a n 0 J U B S x C 2 I S t y A t t ° r n e y SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
F. U. BOX ODU CTATC f- IP"-"-' 
Monticello, Utah 84535 - u - u u,,„ 
Phone 587-2128 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH * 
Plaintiff, * ANSWER TO REQUEST 
vs. FOR DISCOVERY 
ANTHONY STERLING, * Criminal No. 9217-222 
Defendant(8). * 
Attached are the additional documents regarding Requested for 
Discovery as same appear in our files: 
1. See copies of Officer's Report of Rex Dana. 
2. Copy of Witness list that may or may not be used during 
the trial of the Defendant. 
/ # DATED t h i s M ^ day of UUA0\ 1993. 
Craig C. #alls 
San .Juan County Attorney 
I personally delivered a copy to Mr. William Schultz, this 
19th day of August, 1993. 
Cfefcl&W 
ulie Wood Julie Wood 
f
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney srvFUTH DISTRICT C0U?,T 
P . 0 . Box 850 STATE CF UTAH 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ANTHONY STERLING, * Criminal No. 9217-222 
Defendant(s). * 
The State plans to call as witnesses for the above entitled 
matter the following persons: 
1. WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN 
2. KELLY BRADFORD 
3. MONTE DALTON 
4. RICK ELDREDGE 
5. BILL KING 
6. MARTHA JOHNSON 
7. DELL HUNTER 
8. TROY BUTLER 
9. REX DANA 
10. DR. STEVE WARREN 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of August, 1993. 
5aig C. Halls 




























Q Did he kick anyone? 
A Not that I saw. 
Q Thank you. 
THE COURT: You can step down. Call your] 
frext witness Kr. Halls. 
MR. HALLS: We would call Rex Dana. 
THE COURT: Rex Dana. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I'm going to object) 
Ito this witness being called. I don't know if you want to 
pear that objection in the presence or out of the presence] 
pf the jury. 
THE COURT: Well, come and tell me what it] 
Us. 
(Whereupon, counsel for the defense] 
approaches the bench.) 
MR. SCHULTZ: I had found discovery on this) 
land wasn't made aware of Mr. Dana, his report, until — when; 
pas 
lit — Tuesday. I guess, no, it was Wednesday that Julie) 
palled me and offered to fax me his report at that time, 
he'd left a message on my answering machine about one] 
'clock, and I contacted her about three or four. 
THE COURT: Is he a fact witness or — 


















him until we found out that Mr. Davis was going to testify, 
ftnd then he indicated that he had had a conversation with| 
Mr. Dana, or Mr. Davis, so we brought him here for rebuttal, 
essentially. But he has to leave. But the other thing is] 
pe also •• there were some admissions made by Anthony^  
Sterling to him while he was being transported on onej 
pccasion so — but we have — 
THE COURT: Did you know about these beforel 
[Tuesday? 
MR. HALLS: Did I know about — 
MR. SCHULTZ: It was Wednesday. 
THE COURT: ' These admissions beforel 
Wednesday? 
MR. HALLS: Well, it's in his report. He) 
15 o^ade a report and I'm not aware that we didn't supply that. 
16 I MR. SCHULTZ: Julie indicated to me that --1 
17 that you didn't know about it before Wednesday, or she} 
18 pidn't. I don't know how it was brought to your attention 
19 {Anyway ~ 
20 | MR. HALLS: He — he made an investigation ofj 
21 h grievance filed by Anthony Sterling. He came out and 
22 balked to one of the officers, talking to prisoners. He 
23 wrote a report, and I guess that report has been available 
24 jto me but I haven't had it in my file, I mean, I didn't 
25 [really know it existed, except that he had done an 
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1 investigation and found that the jail personnel — thati 
.2 ksn't really part of this — but he did an investigation fon 
3 the Department of Corrections as to whether or not they] 
4 jacted appropriately. That's the basis of his report. 
5 MR. SCHULTZ:. His report doesn't have! 
6 Anything at all about Mr. Davis. I suppose if he's going td 
-.7 pe a rebuttal witness on Mr. Davis, then, of course, you'd 
8 brobably like that in. But if he's testifying to the easel 
9 {in chief about admissions against interest, allegedly made] 
10 py Mr. Sterling, then that's my objection. I 
11 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Halls, though ~ j 
12 MR. HALLS: Well — I 
13 THE COURT: In the first place, Mr. Halls, 
14 they're required to give you those reports, but if he does, 
15 you know, he's required to make them complete to the extent! 
16 [that he has them. If Mr. Halls does not have this report! 
17 then — until this week, then he's only required to give id 
18 jto you when he has it. And you didn't have it until this] 
19 week? 
20 MR. HALLS: No. 
21 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to allow) 
22 the testimony. 
23 MR. SCHULTZ: All right. At the firstl 
24 opportunity after the jury's gone, can I make another] 
25 objection on the record? 
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THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you. J 
THE COURT: Mr. Dana, come forward and take the oath. 
REX PANA 
A WITNESS CALLED at the instance of thd 
plaintiff, having first been duly sworn, was examined and 
testified on his oath as follows: J 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALLS: 
Q State your name and occupation, please. I 
A Rex Dana. I'm an investigator for the Department^ 
pf Corrections. I 
Q What does that mean? What do you do? I 
A One of the main things we do is we handle botw 
knternal and external investigations, personnel] 
investigations, criminal investigations, fugitive^ 
apprehension, drug control and stuff in the prison. 
Q Were you asked to investigate an entry into a cell] 
block in the San Juan County Jail? I 
A I was asked by my supervisor to come down and del 
pi independent investigation of alleged problems here in the 
nail block on one of our inmates, yes. I 
Q And what is the purpose of that investigation, 
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specifically, that one? Why would you be investigating! 
that? 
A I don't know* Just the fact that it was d 
briminal charge. We weren't looking at it as any^  
I^ndependent charges or anything like that. Just come down 
land take a look and do an investigation as requested by SarJ 
uuan County because of there being — involving their] 
pfficers. 
Q So San Juan County wanted some kind of anl 
[independent investigation to.determine whether what they had| 
pone was appropriate or not? 
A That was my understanding when — from my| 
Supervisor. 
Q And what did you do with regards to your] 
[investigation? 
A I came down and spoke with the officers involved, 
jl took a look at the scene. It was being held at that time 
k came down the next day after the incident occurred, or] 
excuse me, the day" the incident had occurred, I believe id 
was. And I came in, took a few pictures, took a look at the 
evidence/ spoke here again with some of the — attempted td 
(speak with some of the inmates that were involved that were 
tin the section. I was told by those inmates that they had) 
peen nothing so I wasn't able to talk with any of them. 
Nobody wanted to speak with me about it. I then left, went! 
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1 to ~ 
I I 
2 Q Let me — let me stop right theree for just 
3 minute. Do you remember — well, did — did you speak withj 
4 every inmate that was in E block? 
5' A I believe it was every inmate that was in there. 
6 I Q And do you — do you specifically remember) 
7 speaking with a Steven Davis? 
8 I A I'm not sure. I don't have it in my records] 
9 specifically by name, just that none of the inmates — all 
10 h I was directed by Sergeant Bradford. He showed me all thel 
11 — took — took me to all the inmates that were involved ori 
12 — or in the section at the time when the incident occurred 
13 and I spoke to each of these, asking them if there was 
14 anything, you know, if they would speak to me about the 
15 kncident. I was told that they were — it varied from not| 
16 knowing anything to not hearing anything to being in their] 
17 pell reading when the incident took place. Nobody wanted to| 
18 (speak with me about it. 
19 Q Okay. Did you ever have an occasion to visit withj 
•20 Anthony Sterling about this event? 
21 A I did. I left this facility and went rightl 
22 fetraight to the Gunnison facility where he was being housed] 
23 and spoke with him there. 
24 Q And who was present? 




Q And is this the — approximately what time? Is| 
Jthe day after the incident occurred? 
A Yes, I believe it would be the day after, if I'it| 
hot mistaken, if I may refer to my report here. You know, 
the incident occurred on the twenty-ninth and yes, it was on| 
|the thirtyith when I spoke with Inmate Sterling. 
Q And how did you conduct your interview with him?| 
)What did you tell him and what did he say to you? 
A I advised him that I was there to get his side of] 
[the story and that I also advised him that he had right nod 
po speak with me. If he did not want to talk, then the 
interview would be concluded and I'd go about my way. He) 
paid he would talk with me. 
I discussed with him what had occurred down here, whatl 
tl was told had occurred, and that I wanted to hear his side] 
pf the story. He then went on to basically say that — 
MR. SCHULTZ: • Objection, Your Honor. Excuse) 
|nae. May I voir dire the witness? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
VOIR DIRE 




























Q Do you go by officer? Do you go by mister? 
A Investigator. 
Q Investigator. Investigator. At the time that you] 
Ispoke with Mr. Sterling, that was in a custodial setting. 
|ls that correct. 
A It was. 
Q And you were employed at that time as an law) 
lenforcement officer. Is that correct? 
A I was. Yes. 
Q Was part of your investigation — did it have to) 
Bo with the fact that Mr. Sterling was the potential subject) 
pf criminal charges or the target of criminal 
A He was. 
Q You told us that you told him that 
|— that he didn't have to speak with you. 
A Right. 
Q You advised him that you didn't have to speak withj 
kiim, but that he 6aid that he would. Did you advise him as] 
jwell that he was the subject of a criminal investigation? 
A No, I did not. I don't remember telling him thatj 
i^e was a subject of an investigation, just that — 
Q Did you advise him that anything he said to youj 




























A No. I just advised him he did not have to speak) 
|to me about it, if he wished not to. 
Q So the only thing that you advised him of in that] 
bustodial setting was the fact that if he didn't want to| 
(talk to you, he didn't have to talk to you. 
A Right. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I would — and I'nj 
boing to have to allege surprise on this, for reasons 
mentioned at the sidebar, I'm going to move to keep thia 
witness from testifying for failure to give proper Miranda] 
learnings to Mr. Sterling. 
THE COURT: Mr. Halls. 
MR. HALLS: Can I ask the witness a couple of] 
|5uestions? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION fresumed) 
BY MR. HALLS: 
Q Mr. Dana, was the- — you did not give him a| 
^iranda warning? 
A I did not read him the Miranda. 
Q The purpose of your interview was not for — for A 
you were not working in behalf of San Juan County or ad 
24 bart of the investigation of the criminal allegations. 
A No, I was not. 
127 
1 Q Your investigation was with regard to disciplinary] 
2 proceedings to find out whether or not this witness — 
3 whether he would be justified in bringing charges againsti 
4 the jail personnel, whether they were overstepping their] 
5 bounds as jail personnel, that kind of thing? 
6 A Exactly. 
7 Q It was done in an administrative capacityf not as] 
8 — not as a law enforcement officer for criminal! 
9 prosecution? 
10 A Absolutely not. 
11 Q And did Mr. Sterling understand when you talked to! 
12 pim — well, you say he — you told him he didn't have toj 
13 talk with you. 
14 A Yeah. I advised him that he had a right to remain] 
15 silent. He didn't need to speak with me if he didn't want] 
16 (to. 
17 Q Is there anything — why would you say he had aj 
18 tight to remain silent? Did you go any further than that? 
19 A No, that's as far as I went. I just ~ I alwaysl 
20 bo that when speaking with inmates if I'm not going — is 
21 k'm just doing an investigation, whether or not they ard 
22 going to be charged criminally, I just let them know thati 
23 phey don't have the right to talk to me — I mean, they have] 
24 the right not to talk to me if they don't want to. 


























phis, you would not have had the authority to charge hinj 
Kith a crime. 
A No# I did not — would not. 
Q And it wasn't your purpose to do this] 
{investigation or to get this statement for the purpose of| 
psing it for charging him with a crime? 
A No, it was not. 
Q And you did not make this available to the Sanl 
[Juan County Sheriff's office as part of their charge in thisj 
prime? 
A No, I did not. I made it — it was made available! 
jto them but my understanding was from my supervisor was thad 
the — the purpose of our investigation was to see if there 
was any wrongdoing upon any — because they're housed herd 
under state, you know, as state inmates, just do a] 
independent investigation to see is there was any wrongdoing 
pn the officers' part that we could see or any problems that] 
we could foresee, not for criminal charges against the) 
linmate or officers. 
Q Did you make that known to Mr. Sterling? 
A I don't remember if I did or not. He asked me| 
Uhat — as I remember, he said something along the lines of, 
"Are you on my side or their side?" I says, "I'm not onj 
24 anybody's side. I'm just here to do an independent] 
Investigation of the facts, not to charge anybody." 
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MR. SCHULTZ: May I ask a couple more? 
MR. HALLS: Yeah. 
CONTINUED VOIR DIRE 
BY MR. SCHULTZ: 
Q Investigator, you state that you did make a copy^  
pf your investigative report available to the San JuarJ 
County authorities? 
A My understanding was, yes, a copy was sent down 
pere. 
Q Okay. And do you know when it was made available 
to San Juan County? 
A I do not. The secretaries would have done that. 
Q Do you know if that — was that the plan before 
krou did the interview with Mr. Sterling that it would be 
made available to San Juan County Sheriff or some 
authorities here? I 
A No. I believe it was — it was requested 
[afterwards and it was sent down, a copy of it. 
Q Do you know when it was requested? J 
A No, I do not. I 
Q
 : Was it sent down because it was requested from you] 
pr was it requested from your supervisor? 
A I guess I don't understand what — j 



























request of you that says, "Send your report down fronj 
jAnthony Sterling down to us in San Juan County"? 
A They may have called me — 
Q All right. 
A (Continuing) — because they knew me and asked me] 
jif I could get a copy sent down. 
Q Do you remember when that was done? 
A I do not. 
Q All right. 
THE COURT: I've heard enough to make a] 
(decision about this. I find that the defendant was notl 
being interrogated in the sense that is intended under] 
Miranda where someone is being accused. The purpose of this 
[investigation at this point was not accusatory, not made in 
kn attempt to secure a confession. It was just an interview 
end that's manifested by the conditions where the — the — 
pie investigator specifically said, "You don't have to talkj 
jto me. If you don't want to talk to me, I'll just leave." 
That's also indicative that even though he was, in the! 
[Larger sense, in custody, he was not held and required, you 
Icnow, he wasn't placed in this room and required to answer] 
questions by the officers — or by this investigator. Hej 
was free to terminate the interview at any time and knew) 
jthat he was and elected to go ahead and answer questions. 



























24 feY MR. HALLS: 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, another aspect ofl 
this, just for the court's — as part of, maybe what I feel] 
pie findings should be, he was not being held in custody fon 
|this — for this event. 
THE COURT: That's right. He was — he was H 
MR. HALLS: He was in custody for anothen 
^harge and so he wasn't being — I 
THE COURT: He had not been arrested on this 
bharge and no decision had even been made that the charge 
would be filed. It was at a very — very preliminary stage.| 
Bo, I'm going to — I'm going to allow the questions withj 
(regard to what statements he made. 
MR. SCHULTZ: I was just going to point out, 
land I guess I don't need to make a record on this point, 
when you say no decision was made, the charge — were in a] 
istate of flux, I would point out the proximity between this 
interview and the time that the information was filed in the] 
base. It was filed inside a week. 
THE COURT: Well, okay, but still it was| 
[filed a week later. Go ahead, Mr. Halls. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed! 




1 MR. SCHULTZ: Well, why don't we just takej 
2 pirn out of order then. 
3 MR. HALLS: We'll do that right after recess 
4 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Schultz, dcj 
5 Jyou want to make a record with regard to the — 
6 MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, that's correct, Yourj 
7 Honor. I just want to put on the record the — my objection^  
8 co Mr. Dana being allowed to testify. I would allege soma 
9 surprise on that. I was not advised until Wednesday night 
10 kn a conversation with Mr. Halls' office that he would 
11 botentialjy be a witness. They offered to fax his report tc] 
12 me that evening. It was about four o'clock, and I just said] 
13 k would pick them up the next morning when I was here. 
14 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Halls, you represented 
15 to the court that you did not receive the report until when?] 
16 I MR. HALLS: For that purpose, Your Honor 
17 phis report was received by the county attorney's office onj 
18 August 18, 1993, is when it was received in my office and 
19 {stamped. That's Wednesday. 
20 THE COURT: All right. And that's when youj 
21 determined that you would be using that? 
22 MR. HALLS: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Schultz, canj 
24 you tell me what prejudice you suffered as a result of] 
25 (finding out about that two days ago rather than two months 
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1 bgo? 
2 MR. SCHULTZ: Well, Your Honor, originally} 
3 when I raised the specter of prejudice, I expected that Mr* 
4 Dana was going to testify a little more extensively than he) 
5 ended up testifying, I was advised by the county attorney's 
6 office that he was going to give some rebuttal or say that] 
7 he had interviewed my witness, Mr. Davis, and that Mr. David 
8 bold him that he had heard threats and made some othed 
9 statements, and we were going to allege prejudice in that] 
10 [respect. 
11 THE COURT: Well, him not — the only thingl 
12 he testified is that Mr. Davis didn't — told him he didn't 
13 want — either told him he didn't want to talk to him or he 
14 pidn't know anything. So that being the case, what] 
15 prejudice was there? 
16 I MR. SCHULTZ: I understand that as regard to] 
17 Mr. Davis and then,. Your Honor, I — I guess I would allege 
18 surprise then by not having seen this report that — thatJ 
19 Mr. Dana was going- to testify that Mr. Sterling told hiitj 
20 that when he came in that he was going to hurt them or he) 
21 would hurt them when they came in. 
22 THE COURT: But ~ but how was that ~ what'si 
23 the prejudice there, Mr. Schultz? What is it that you were 
24 hot able to do in the last two days that you could have dond 
25 p.n the lfcst two months if you'd known two months earlied 
203 
* 
1 fcbout this? 
2 MR. SCHULTZ: Perhaps, Your Honor, had I been! 
3 able to disclose that to my client that that is, we may have 
4 been able to get a more advantageous plea bargain. He may] 
5 pave taken a plea. 
6 THE COURT: So it's just that he may have) 
7 taken a plea if you'd known that? 
8 MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: All right. That — the objection! 
10 to the admission of that evidence is overruled. I guess] 
11 we've got two minutes until the jury will be back. 
12 MR. SCHULTZ: Mr., Your Honor, Mr. Sterling! 
13 indicates to me that he needs to use the restroom, and l| 
14 kmagine with all the apparatus he may be a little late so. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Well, the clerk will| 
16 pall me when everybody's back. Court's in recess. 
17 (Whereupon, the Court takes a short recess.) 
18 THE BAILIFF: Rise. Seventh District Court! 
19 lis now in session. Please be seated. 
20 THE COURT: The record will show that members! 
21 pf the jury are present. That defendant and his counsel are) 
22 present. Counsel for the state is present. Mr. Halls. 
23 MR. HALLS: Dr. Warren is still seeing ai 
24 patient and so rather than wait for him, we would like to] 
25 proceed with Bill Christensen. 
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1 opportunity to talk about a couple of things. I guess thej 
2 (first-thing I'd like to ask on behalf of Mr. Sterling is fori 
3 Lhatevter reasons the Sheriff's office has determined to keed 
4 kiim shackled during this stage of the proceedings, and wd 
5 would .'like the court's permission to allow him to remain 
6 seated, such that his shackles won't be displayed to thej 
7 hoty! '•' 
I « 
I * 
8 THE COURT: That's fine. 
9 ' MR. SCHULTZ: Other than that, Your Honor, 
10 puriiig closing arguments Mr. Sterling advised me of the factl 
11 that-a law enforcement officer had come into the courtroom 
I • • I 
I * I 
12 with a. weapon and was behind him, apparently brandishing the 
I <* * 1 
13 weapon. or handling it in a nervous fashion, such as td 
14 convey to the jury that it was impression that Mr. Sterling 
15 was a 'security risk. He expressed some concern to me about] 
16 pome prejudice that might give the jury against him. 
I • 
17 He asked me to make a motion to dismiss. I advised hiiri 
I • • • 
I r • " 
18 [that I didn't think the court would dismiss the charges 
19 against him on that — on the basis of that happening, that] 
20 (the aourt might consider that as grounds to declare d 
21 mistrial. And in speaking with him, he has told me that he) 
. { 
22 will taive that he is aware ctf that but that he's anxious to) 
23 bet a verdict on this today and that he waives any prejudice 
I #*,r 
24 pr any'.problems that may have been caused by reason of that] 
25 ^fficer. displaying that weapon. Is that correct, Anthony? 
- < ::. 





















MR. STERLING: I just feel it should be noted 
bo that it doesn't happen again and maybe prejudice somebody] 
pise's trial. 
THE COURT: Okay. I didn't notice that, 
jiidn't notice an officer doing that. Mr. Halls, you hafvej 
pometh'ing you want to say about that? 
MR. HALLS: Well, yeah. I guess my feeling] 
{is if that is going to go on the record at all and may be] 
pomething that somebody could bring up on appeal at all, wd 
I V . I] 
should?;, know exactly what the defendant feels like he savi 
I • I 
pecausje when that was brought up, I would like the record^  td 
pote that neither defense counsel nor ittyself nor the offiber| 
that iras sitting with me nor the bailiff nor the judge 
potiqed any such activity. 
THE COURT: That's correct. None of — riond 
t< v 
16 bf us noticed that except the defendant and — and — B 
I • • I 
17 bould 'also indicate that I 'was watching the jury dutind 
18 closing arguments. They seemed to be paying attention to) 
19 the lawyers and not to other ^things. 
20 I V# V MR. HALLS: The only other thing is I would 
21 (like to know maybe what he considers to be brandishing a] 
22 Weapon because ~ 
• « 
THE COURT: Would you just tell us what it isl 























brandishing. I said handling. Monte Dalton was sitting 
tight here beside that little newspaper right there, kept ori 
[reaching up and like rubbing his hip right where his firearm 
kas at. Victims cannot bring firearms. And I don't have aj 
broblem with it, like you said, the jury was paying) 
attention to the attorneys. I just need this noted that, 
{you know — 
THE COURT: All right. 
v». * MR. STERLING: (Continuing) — I feltj 
threatened. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. STERLING:. And if the jury — 
•'*•' THE COURT: So you're — what you're! 
• I 
{indicating is that Mr. Dalton was sitting right behind you H 
v \ 
«. 
MR. STERLING: I felt threatened by his) 
[firearm. 
THE COURT: (Continuing) ~ and that he was] 
jrubbing his hip where his firearm was located. 
MR. STERLING: He had his hand on hid 
21 [firearms, on the butt of his firearm. He had a 9mm in his) 
22 holster. 
23 I THE COURT: And of course, when — whenl 
24 bfficers have firearms in the courtroom, we want them to be 



























MR. STERLING: He's a victim in this case. 
MR. HALLS: Well, and I'm not even — I don't] 
think-fehat there's any indication that he even had a firearm 
pn. I don't know that he did. I don't think it's beerJ 
I «4 I 
proven- that he even had a firearm or maybe it was just an| 
(empty holster. -
THE COURT: Yeah, it may — we're — 
MR. STERLING:- Okay. Then let's just forget! 
jthe idea, if we've got to go through all the — all the| 
[lying and the bullshit. 
*f MR. HALLS: $o — but all this is going onl 
|the record and so we have no indication that he even had a] 
irearjn and the brandishing thing is maybe an overstatement. 
he was'.rubbing his hip behind the defendant is about where] 
Ke're. fet. 
. .' MR. STERLING:' He was rubbing the butt-end ofl 
>. I 




THE COURT: Okay. It's actually — 
. . MR. STERLING! He's a victim. A victinj 
pannot carry a gun in a courtroom. 
; .; THE COURT: Mr. Sterling, all right ~ 
MR. STERLING: Am I wrong? 
THE COURT: (Continuing) — You're not —J 





















|tell.us what it is you saw. 
MR. SCHULTZ: We're just trying to make the] 
tecofit. 
MR. STERLING: That's what I'm saying, 
jion't want to argue. I'm just making a note of it. 
THE COURT: Okay, then be quiet — then be) 
,• • 
Jjuiet \«— be quiet . 
« 
MR. STERLING: Yes, s i r . 
% 
THE COURT: All right. Well, it is the! 
jpoliey^  of the court that they — at the present time we're 
evaluating that officers, except for the bailiff and those 
I '*• I 
(in chajfcge of a state prisoner, not have any firearms and so) 
he may.;.not have had his firearm at all. So, there's noj 
(finding that he actually had his firearm. In any event, 
jit's -£ it's — the defendant has stated he doesn't want to| 
•< 
(ask (of a mistrial. 
» 
Now, I think we need to make a record about something 
* * I 
18 felse that happened. The bailiff was a new bailiff and he) 
19 went into the — he went into the jury room with the jurors 
20 and showed them where the restroom was and he stayed in 
21 there ..for some time. I think he believes that he was 
I • ' 
I * 
22 feupppsed to stay in the jury room with the jury. When we) 
23 (found .'that he was doing that, I think it was about five] 
24 hinute's after we'd excused the jury, the clerk went in and 
25 (retrieved the bailiff so that he was outside of the — he) 
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1 (tell.us what it is you saw. 
2 MR. SCHULTZ: We're just trying to make thej 
3 (record. 
MR. STERLING: That's what I'm saying. 
5 [don't want to argue. I'm just making a note of it 
THE COURT: Okay, then be quiet — then be| 
7 [juiefc \-- be quiet. 
8 | MR. STERLING: Yes, sir. 
9 | THE COURT: All right. Well, it is thel 
10 bolicy^  of the court that they — at the present time we're 
I ** I 
11 evaluating that officers, except for the bailiff and those 
• ** *. i 
I .**• i 
12 {in chatge of a state prisoner, not have any firearms and soj 













[finding that he actually had his firearm. In any event, 
• %4 jit's -i it's — the defendant has stated he doesn't want to| 
•<. 
fask for a mistrial. 
Now, I think we need to make a record about something) 
jelse that happened. The bailiff was a new bailiff and he 
went into the — he went into the jury room with the jurors 
and showed them where the restroom was and he stayed in 
there ..for some time. I think he believes that he was 
• •• * 
I * *• I 
(supposed to stay in the jury room with the jury. When wd 
pound 'that he was doing that, I think it was about five] 






















1 was not in the presence of the jury during anything exceptJ 
t • 
V* 
perhaps the first five minutes of their deliberations. 
Now, do you want to make any issue about that, Mr. 
iSchultz? 
» 
MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, I do, Your Honor. And 
that's! something, of course, that I can follow up with the 
I * *' • 
nurorsr irtyself in the event of an unfavorable verdict. But! 
I ' .f I 
u. guess I would like the court to question the bailiff as to) 
Lrheth&r or not he had any conversations or communications] 
• * |with the — with any of the jurors or — 
« : •. 
THE COURT: Bailiff, Mr. Bailiff, did you —| 
|did the jurors ask you any questions? 
./. THE BAILIFF: * No questions were asked and t\ 
|sat in- the corner. 
THE COURT: You sat in the corner? 
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. I sat away from them by| 
the machine that's in there. 
.*.;£ 
V THE COURT: All right. 
J THE BAILIFF: '(Continuing) — They didn't askj 
\ne any questions and I didn't speak to them. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Had they begun theirl 
25 
22 Deliberations? 
23 THE COURT: Had they begun the deliberation^ 
24 kherrypu were asked to leave? 






























[they were going to pick a foreman. It was more on picking 
the foreman and what they were going to do rather than on 
peliberations. • I 
THE COURT: So — so they hadn't begun td 
•* I 
i *• I 
discuss the merits of the case yet? Just how they werd 
poing'*to pick a foreman. Is that right? 
* * I 
THE BAILIFF: They'd started talking aboutJ 
(the mpp wringer and I told them, there it is if you want to) 
I *' I 
took''at it. That's about it. But they'd started talking 
I *  I 
pbout that. One of the jurors had talked about Anthony. I] 
nust pointed out that they — you know# the evidence wad 
(there, that they could — 
THE COURT: Well, you also brought the] 
|evidence into the jury. 
THE BAILIFF: Yes. 
-• THE COURT: Was that ~ was that when someone! 
br said something about the mop wringer is when you brought) 
I * 
|the evidence in? 
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. Pretty much. Well, wher^  
[they §at down, one of the jurors started talking about it. 
: THE COURT: Well, what do you want me to do, 
Hr. Schultz? 
••• 
MR. SCHULTZ: ^  I guess I'm in kind of a bind, 
[your Honor. Mr. Sterling advises me on this issue as well] 






























po you taking the bench, about this issue as well as the 
gun, and he indicated at that time as well as now that he 
poesn't want to ask this court for a mistrial. That he justi 
pants to go ahead and have the matter resolved today. So, 
k — I guess I'm asking — not asking the court for anythingl 
jabout that. On the other hand, I thinks it's something that] 
i' 
II'd ~ in the event of an unfavorable verdict, would feel] 
• * >. I 
compelled to speak to some of the jurors myself to see ifl 
(the officer's presence there had any effect on them. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. But — but based on] 
the evidence, by what you've been told at this point, you'rej 
pot asking for a mistrial, is that right? 
MR. SCHULTZ: No, Your Honor. And that's at) 
• • • • 
frny client's instructions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that correct, 
^r. Sterling? 
MR. STERLING: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. How, Mr. Bailiff, 
^ou'ye indicated that the jury has reached a verdict? 
THE BAILIFF: Yes. I was contacted. 
THE COURT: All right. Then would you go and 
|sscort the jury into the courtroom. 
THE BAILIFF: Okay. 
(Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m. the jury returned tcj 
Ithe cdurtroom.) 
I ii: : 
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